Does Institutional Design Make a Difference? by Calabresi, Steven G.
Copyright  2015  by  Steven  G.  Calabresi Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  109,  No.  3 
577 
Symposium 
DOES INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN MAKE  
A DIFFERENCE? 
Steven G. Calabresi 
ABSTRACT—This Essay argues that there are two unappreciated aspects of 
U.S. constitutional design that have contributed to our country’s success. 
The first is the fact that the United States is divided into fifty rather than 
four states. This greatly strengthens the national government and renders 
secession almost impossible. The second is the formidable set of checks 
and balances set up on presidential power that makes it impossible for U.S. 
presidents to become dictators. The fact that thirty-nine of the fifty state 
governors are elected in off-year or midterm elections, elections in which 
the incumbent president’s party almost always loses ground to the 
opposition, greatly limits U.S. presidential power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest questions that hangs over political science and the 
legal academy is whether the institutional design of a constitutional 
democracy affects its success. I firmly believe that institutional design 
makes an important difference. Others argue that the effects of institutional 
design are dwarfed by the effects of linguistic, racial, and ethnic 
homogeneity; culture; religion; or poverty. 
The chief skeptic of the institutional-design-makes-a-difference 
argument on the Northwestern Law faculty is my good friend and colleague 
Jide Nzelibe. Professor Nzelibe is acutely aware of how little institutional 
design has contributed to good governance in some constitutional 
democracies, such as Nigeria. Nigeria has an American-style constitution 
with separation of powers and federalism,1 but those institutional features 
are dwarfed by the division between Christians and Muslims and problems 
of corruption.2 If the U.S. Constitution is, as I think it is, an institutional 
success story, the Nigerian constitution stands as a reproach. The lack of 
crosscutting cleavages in Nigeria seems to trump an otherwise successful 
constitutional design. 
Two distinctive features of American constitutionalism that have been 
much copied abroad are the U.S. systems of federalism and presidential 
separation of powers.3 The results have not been very encouraging. In 
otherwise stable western constitutional democracies such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain, federalism has led to powerful separatist 
 
1 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfThe
FederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm [http://perma.cc/97G-52T3]. 
2 See John Campbell & Asch Harwood, Why a Terrifying Religious Conflict Is Raging in Nigeria, 
ATLANTIC (Jul. 10, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/why-a-
terrifying-religious-conflict-is-raging-in-nigeria/277690/ [http://perma.cc/L39M-W6U2]; Adam 
Nossiter, Toll from Religious and Ethnic Violence in Nigeria Rises to 500, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/world/africa/09nigeria.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/CCN9-92RX].  
3 See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 25, 84 (Braz.); S. AFR. CONST., 
1996, ch. 3, § 40. 
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movements,4 and, as a result, the specter of secession hangs over those 
countries. The experience abroad with exports of U.S.-style presidential 
separation of powers has been, if anything, even worse. Many presidential 
separation of powers democracies in Latin America have at one time or 
another degenerated into an authoritarian system of one-man presidential 
rule,5 and the same thing has also happened in Russia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and South Korea.6 As a result, political scientists, advisers, and 
constitution writers today often weigh in against federal or separation of 
powers systems and in favor of unitary, parliamentary structures.7 Those 
unitary parliamentary structures, however, have also degenerated into 
authoritarian rule as in Japan and Italy prior to World War II. 
In this Essay, I identify two key features of U.S. constitutional design 
that I think are integral to the success of U.S. federal and presidential 
separation of powers. These features, however, are not widely known and 
not widely copied when emerging democracies choose to write a 
constitution. In Part I, I focus on the facts that American federalism is 
characterized by a much larger number of state entities than exist in most 
federal regimes and that state boundary lines are drawn fairly arbitrarily, 
crosscutting regional, religious, and ethnic boundaries. In Part II, I 
 
4 Québec in Canada, Scotland in the United Kingdom, and both Catalonia and the Basque Region 
in Spain have all had credible movements for secession. See Stephen Castle, In Scotland, Avid Activists 
Fuel ‘Yes’ Campaign for Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/
18/world/europe/scotland-referendum-on-independence.html [http://perma.cc/TM7J-D5T3]; Andrew 
Cohen, Is Canada Ready for the Return of Quebec Separatists?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2012, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/is-canada-ready-for-the-return-of-quebec-
separatists/261994/ [http://perma.cc/VNR4-2P6J]; Raphael Minder, Rallying Catalans to the Separatist 
Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/world/europe/carme-forcadell-
barcelona-catalonia-spain.html [http://perma.cc/TFM2-66EM]. 
5 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 645–46 (2000); see 
also Kurt Weyland, Why Latin America Is Becoming Less Democratic, ATLANTIC (Jul. 15, 2014, 3:04 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/why-latin-america-is-becoming-less-
democratic/277803/ [http://perma.cc/7FDK-GFD6] (discussing Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and 
Argentina). 
6 See, e.g., Tom Lantos, Putting Democracy First in Relations with Russia, 29 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 13, 13 (2005) (“The record shows, however, that Russia has undergone numerous 
important reversals in human rights, the rule of law, and freedom of expression since Putin took power 
in 2000. The country has eliminated virtually all independent media, clamped down on political 
opposition, conducted seriously flawed parliamentary and presidential elections, jailed business leaders 
who were perceived to be hostile to the state, used dubious excuses to nationalize the largest private oil 
company, and, most recently, eliminated direct elections of regional governors and representatives.”). 
7 See, e.g., John Gerring et al., Are Parliamentary Systems Better?, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 327, 353 
(2009) (“In an age of democratic transition, few questions have greater practical import than that of 
constitutional engineering. . . . The evidence presented here suggests that to the extent that the nature of 
the executive makes a difference, parliamentary systems offer significant advantages over presidential 
systems. In no case examined here does parliamentary rule seem to detract from good governance. In 
most policy areas, particularly in the areas of economic and human development, parliamentary systems 
are associated with superior governance.”). 
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highlight five features of the U.S. system of presidential separation of 
powers. These five features make American presidents much weaker than 
those in other presidential systems, such as France. The failures of 
presidential systems in other countries are largely due to their failure to 
copy aspects of U.S. constitutionalism that constrain our presidents. I focus 
my discussion in both parts on the experience of those countries with 
constitutional democracies that are members of the Group of Twenty (G20) 
nations, which together produce 85% of the world’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).8 If we could better explain and understand the constitutional 
experience in the G20 nations, we could do so all over the world. 
I should be clear at the outset that I am starting with a very distinctive 
and controversial premise. I think the U.S. Constitution, as it has been 
amended and evolved, is a spectacular success story from which there is an 
enormous amount to learn. The United States is the third most populous 
country in the world (excluding the European Union which is not a nation 
state), the fourth largest territorially, and produces the highest GDP and one 
of the highest GDPs per capita in the world.9 In fact, the United States is 
very conscious of its citizens’ rights and liberties in its domestic 
governance. Although the United States had a troubled history in the past, 
due to slavery and race discrimination, that history was decisively and 
permanently repudiated in the 1960s,10 and the United States today has 
fewer problems with race, ethnicity, and religious discrimination than most 
of the G20 countries.11 Finally, the U.S. Constitution is by far the oldest 
and longest-lasting constitution in the world. It has truly stood the test of 
time.   
For all of these reasons, I believe, as former President Ronald Reagan 
used to say, that the United States is “A Shining City on a Hill”—a beacon 
of liberty and democracy, which ought to inspire and be an example to the 
rest of the world.12 In this Essay I explain key features of institutional 
 
8 G20, POLICY NOTE: A FORUM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2014), available at https://g20.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/0180-Policy-Note-Red-21st-Century-for-web-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8Q3-
ELHW]. 
9 Cent. Intelligence Agency, United States, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html [https://perma.cc/XW86-GTQT]. 
10 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. 
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
11 Max Fisher, A Fascinating Map of the World’s Most and Least Racially Tolerant Countries, 
WASH. POST, May 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/15/a-
fascinating-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-racially-tolerant-countries/ [http://perma.cc/SB73-
CUFX]. 
12 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme 
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2006). 
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design in American federalism and presidential separation of powers, 
which make American institutions work. Other countries that seek to 
emulate our success need a better understanding of the subtleties of 
institutional design that undergird the success of the U.S. Constitution. 
I. U.S. FEDERALISM 
A key feature of the U.S. Constitution is its federal structure.13 Our 
powerful national government is checked and balanced by fifty state 
governments, which are equally represented in the U.S. Senate. The Senate 
is the more important of the two houses of Congress due to its role in 
picking federal judges, confirming executive branch officials, and making 
treaties. For over 225 years, the Senate has protected state prerogatives, and 
it continues to do so today. As a result, 95% of all cases tried in American 
courts are tried in state and not federal courts.14 Additionally, the 
substantive law of contract, property, torts, inheritance, family law, and 
criminal law are overwhelmingly areas of state law, which is not true in 
most other federations. Collectively, the states tax and spend about the 
same percentage of the nation’s wealth as the national government,15 
another indicia of state coequality with the national government. State 
governments in the United States have more constitutional power than in 
many other federations, yet there is hardly any discussion of states 
considering secession from the United States—an issue that was 
conclusively settled by the experience of the Civil War. Why have states in 
the United States, which hold a great deal of constitutional power, managed 
to avoid discussion of secession while states and provinces in other 
federations, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium, 
have not? 
To begin, I think federalism as it is constructed in the United States 
today maximizes wealth and happiness. U.S. federalism allows our national 
government to maintain the world’s largest and most effective military 
force; it creates a domestic free-trade zone, which, thanks to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), extends across the whole of 
the continental United States; it creates a national government, which can 
stop air and water pollution in one state that may otherwise inflict negative 
 
13 To read the author’s full views on the virtues of American federalism, see Steven G. Calabresi & 
Lucy D. Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law, in 
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV 123 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014). 
14 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 280 (8th ed. 2012). 
15 See Revenue by Government Level 2000–2012, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter. 
org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=328 [http://perma.cc/D6VN-BC4G]. 
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externalities on other states; and it allows for a national bill of rights and 
civil rights acts that protect liberty and equality throughout the country. 
At the same time, U.S. federalism leaves the states free to experiment 
and compete. A wide range of issues are tackled at the state level including: 
taxing and spending, the amount of wealth redistribution, the use of 
voucher systems and charter schools in education, criminal law policy, 
assisted suicide, and marijuana and alcohol use. Americans deliberately 
choose to live in states that reflect their values, as is explained by Bill 
Bishop in The Big Sort.16 Anyone who looks at presidential election maps 
knows that Democratic-blue-state America and Republican-red-state 
America diverge on a wide range of cultural, religious, economic, and other 
issues. Yet that divergence is peaceful and leads to different policies state 
by state. The United States has all the military and free trade benefits of an 
empire, all the while allowing for heterogeneous social policies on many 
important issues. 
To emphasize the U.S. system’s success, compare American 
federalism with constitutional regimes among the G20 democracies.17 The 
United States has a stronger foreign policy and military presence by an 
overwhelming margin than any other G20 democracy. The U.S.-led 
NAFTA free trade zone is almost as populous as the European Union free 
trade zone, but is not encumbered by the problem of debt-ridden members 
in need of bailouts that faces the European Union. Moreover, the United 
States has free trade agreements with many other countries outside of 
NAFTA and is an active member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)—the leading global free trade system.18 In addition to its 
demonstrated strengths in foreign policy and trade, the United States also 
vigorously protects the civil rights of individuals nationwide.19 The same 
cannot be said of, for example, the European Union, France, or even the 
United Kingdom. In important respects, the U.S. federal government is far 
 
16 BILL BISHOP WITH ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-
MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009). 
17 This Article has intentionally excluded the G20 regimes in China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia from 
the current discussion because their authoritarian regimes do not allow for comparison. 
18 GATT was first created in 1947 by the allied nations of World War II. See General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) took over GATT functions and began operating in 1995. See Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 555, 555–57 (1996); Alec Stone 
Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 152 (2008). 
19 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights 
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2173–74 (1999) (arguing that criticisms of the federal government’s 
“disinclination to apply international human rights law to domestic officials . . . tend[s] to overlook the 
extraordinary human rights protections the United States offers through its domestic constitutional and 
democratic processes”). 
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more powerful than the federal governments of the European Union, 
Argentina, Brazil, Germany, India, Mexico, Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, and, since devolution, the United Kingdom. The U.S. federal 
government is also enormously more powerful than the centralized, 
national governments of France, Japan, Italy, Turkey, Indonesia, and South 
Korea. 
At the same time, the U.S. government is more thoroughly 
decentralized and leaves more matters to be decided at the state level than 
do federations such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Australia, India, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and, arguably, the European Union. By 
definition, more power is devolved in the United States than in any of the 
G20 unitary nation states such as France, Japan, Italy, Turkey, Indonesia, 
and South Korea. The only two G20 countries that come close to devolving 
as much power to their national subunits are Germany and Canada. 
Unfortunately, I do not have space in this brief Essay to discuss the subtle 
differences between U.S. federalism and German and Canadian federalism. 
Suffice it to say that Canada has a population smaller than the State of 
California,20 whereas Germany’s population is less than the combined 
populations of California, Texas, and New York.21 These are very small-
scale federations compared to the U.S. federal system and are thus frankly 
much less important. 
The federal system of the European Union, while considered by some 
to be a failure in foreign policy and national defense,22 has succeeded in 
providing free trade among its twenty-eight member nations while still 
devolving power to the member states’ national governments. The 
European Union regime, however, is deeply unpopular in leading nations 
such as the United Kingdom and France.23 It suffers from a severe 
 
20 Compare Cent. Intelligence Agency, Canada, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html [https://perma.cc/9243-PHAX] (stating that Canada’s 
population is 34,834,841), with California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/06000.html [http://perma.cc/2SBK-2DK5] (stating that California’s population is 38,332,521). 
21 Germany has a population of roughly 81 million compared to California, New York, and Texas’s 
combined total population of around 84 million. Compare Cent. Intelligence Agency, Germany, 
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html 
[https://perma.cc/E3UC-WJRQ] (Germany’s population is 80,996,685), with California, supra note 20 
(stating that California’s population is 38,332,521), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html [http://perma.cc/T84S-43W6] (stating that New 
York’s population is 19,651,127), and Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/48000.html [http://perma.cc/BD6M-AXUH] (stating that Texas’s population is 26,448,193). 
22 See Ian Ward, The Challenges of European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Retrospective 
and Prospective, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 5 (2005). 
23 Luke Baker & Anders Melin, Most Europeans, Especially the French, Unhappy About EU, 
REUTERS, June 5, 2013, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/uk-eu-popularity-poll-
idUKBRE9540F620130605 [http://perma.cc/TL3D-7B8L]. 
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democracy deficit, and it is unable to bail out Greece, a greatly troubled 
economy deeply in need of help, much less other troubled economies such 
as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and France. The European Union is not nearly as 
successful today in either domestic or foreign policy as is the federal 
system of the United States. 
The success of U.S. federalism in providing simultaneously strong and 
decentralized government is especially remarkable when one considers that 
the United States does not presently face any serious secessionist 
movement. The United States stands in sharp contrast to the many 
secessionist movements present in other G20 countries such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and France. Canada, for example, faces 
constant secessionist pressure from Québec,24 the United Kingdom faces 
secessionist pressure from Scotland,25 the European Union faces 
secessionist pressure from the United Kingdom,26 Italy faces secessionist 
pressure from the Northern League and Venice,27 France faces secessionist 
pressure from Corsica,28 Spain faces secessionist pressure from Catalonia 
and the Basque regions,29 Russia faces secessionist pressure from 
Chechnya,30 and China faces secessionist pressure from Tibet.31 Even tiny 
Belgium appears the process of splitting into two or three new nation 
 
24 See L. Kinvin Wroth, Quebec, Canada and the First Nations: The Problem of Secession, 23 VT. 
L. REV. 709, 709–10 (1999). 
25 See Griff Witte & Karla Adam, In Decisive Vote, Scotland Rejects Independence, Sticks with the 
U.K., WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-decisive-vote-scotland-
rejects-independence-sticks-with-the-uk/2014/09/19/dd4505e0-e71e-45ae-aa8d-6fa4a8a1dbe1_story.
html [http://perma.cc/LX3Y-K58B]. 
26 See Laura Smith-Spark & Susannah Cullinane, Cameron Promises Referendum on Britain’s 
Place in Europe, CNN (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/23/world/europe/uk-
cameron-europe [http://perma.cc/KE8-PSHV]. 
27 See Matt Ford, Europe’s Latest Secession Movement: Venice?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2014, 2:00 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/europes-latest-secession-movement-
venice/284562/ [http://perma.cc/49WD-HSAJ]. 
28 See JÉRÔME FOURQUET, ENQUÊTE SUR LA SITUATION EN CORSE [INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
SITUATION IN CORSICA] 12–16 (2008), available at http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/situationcorse.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/JU6F-5237] (finding that over 50% of respondents wanted more autonomy for Corsica, 
although only 10% of respondents wanted Corsica to be completely independent of France). 
29 See Raphael Minder, With Eye on Scotland, Catalonia Hails Its Secession Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/world/europe/with-eye-on-scotland-catalonia-hails-its-
secession-bid.html [http://perma.cc/FRF6-6RZ9]. 
30 See Mike Bowker, Russia and Chechnya: The Issue of Secession, 10 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 
461, 462–65 (2004). 
31 See Dan Levin, Tibetan Student Burns Himself to Death in Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/world/asia/tibetan-student-burns-himself-to-death-in-protest.
html&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/FY22-9M9L]. 
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states.32 Why then is the U.S. federal government simultaneously so strong, 
decentralized, and free of credible threats of secession? The answer lies in 
what I have called in a prior article: “The Number of States and the 
Economics of Federalism.”33 
A. The Number of States and the Economics of Federalism 
The United States is unique among the federations of the world in that 
(1) it has a very large number of federal subunits; and (2) the boundaries of 
those federal subunits are drawn to cut across—rather than reinforce—
regional, cultural, and religious differences. The significance of each point 
is discussed below in turn. 
First, the United States has fifty member States, which makes it 
unique among the G20 federations. In contrast, the Federal Republic of 
Germany has sixteen member states,34 Canada has ten provinces,35 the 
United Kingdom has four entities with devolved power,36 Australia has six 
member states,37 the European Union has twenty-eight member States,38 
India has twenty-eight member States and seven territories,39 Brazil has 
twenty-six member States,40 Mexico has thirty-one member States,41 and 
Argentina has twenty-three member States.42 
One consequence of the division of the U.S. federation into fifty 
subunits is that it imposes huge costs on would-be secessionists. All of the 
fifty United States, with the possible exceptions of California and Texas, 
are quite simply too small in geography or population to imagine existing 
 
32 James Fontanella-Kahn, Secessionist Wave Sweeps Belgium, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70477188-1636-11e2-b6f1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QYfqQ8hl 
[http://perma.cc/72U2-TWEM]. 
33 Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American 
Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6–32 (2011). 
34 Germany, supra note 21. 
35 Canada, supra note 20. 
36 Cent. Intelligence Agency, United Kingdom, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html [http://perma.cc/P7F2-3W4F]. 
37 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Australia, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html [http://perma.cc/TN89-4K96]. 
38 Cent. Intelligence Agency, European Union, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html [http://perma.cc/4R9K-Q23D]. 
39 Cent. Intelligence Agency, India, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/in.html [http://perma.cc/CXN5-3CSZ]. 
40 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Brazil, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/br.html [http://perma.cc/54W4-KB2A]. 
41 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Mexico, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html [http://perma.cc/YL7R-PC66]. 
42 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Argentina, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html [http://perma.cc/8MD3-TEQC]. 
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as separate nations. As a result, secession does not tend to make its way 
onto the agenda of ordinary politics. 
In theory, a group of states could collectively try to secede, as 
happened in 1860 and 1861 at the start of the Civil War,43 but the division 
of the U.S. federation into a very large number of federal subunits imposes 
huge collective action costs on such efforts. The Civil War helps to 
illustrate this point. In 1861, there were thirty-four states, fifteen of which 
were slave states.44 Only eleven of the fifteen slave-states were successful 
in seceding. Four slave states—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and 
Missouri—stayed in the Union, while a large number of free counties in the 
slave State of Virginia seceded from the State of Virginia to form the new, 
free, pro-Union State of West Virginia.45 The collective action costs of 
organizing slave-state secession in 1860 and 1861 were prohibitively high. 
Only two-thirds of the slave states were able to organize themselves to 
secede and join the constitution of the southern Confederacy.46 
This is the collective action problem that saved the Union. The Civil 
War was a close and hard-fought struggle in which more Americans died 
than in any other war the United States has fought. As late as the summer 
of 1864 it appeared that the North was losing the Civil War and President 
Lincoln would not be reelected. Had the slave states of Maryland, 
Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri seceded, forcing the relocation of the 
capitol to New York or Philadelphia, the North would probably have lost 
the Civil War. The slave states ultimately failed in their movement due to 
the collective action costs of getting fifteen slave states to agree on a 
common course of action to preserve slavery. 
Fast-forward to today and imagine a U.S. federal government with 
only four states instead of fifty: (1) the Northeast, (2) the South, (3) the 
Midwest, and (4) the West. Would there be serious secessionist pressures in 
such a four state federation? Of course, there is no way to know for sure, 
but my observation of American politics over the last forty-five years 
leaves me convinced that some regional subunit or other would secede 
from such a four-state federation. The collective action costs of secession 
would be so low, and the sense of regional identity would be so high that I 
 
43 JOHN SHARPE, Secession, in 4 AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: THE DEFINITIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA AND 
DOCUMENT COLLECTION 1728, 1728–29 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2013). 
44 Results from the 1860 Census, CIVIL WAR HOME PAGE, http://www.civil-war.net/pages/1860
_census.html [http://perma.cc/4R7V-XT8X] (last updated 2009) (counting fifteen states that recorded 
the number of slaveholders). 
45 Amy Murrell Taylor, The Border States, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/resources/
story.htm?id=205 [http://perma.cc/E3UR-2UYP] (last updated Apr. 2, 2015). 
46 Id. 
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think secession would become a real threat. Moreover, a four-state 
federation would have a much weaker federal government than the current 
fifty-state U.S. federation because the states would be so much more 
powerful relative to the national government. Federations with only four 
states are not unheard of in the world: Pakistan, for example, is a four-state 
federation.47 There is, in my opinion, no way that the Northeast and the 
South could live together in a four-state U.S. federation. One or the other of 
these regions would inevitably secede, eliminating the free trade and 
foreign policy successes of the current fifty-state U.S. federation. 
B. The Arbitrariness of State Boundary Lines 
The second aspect of U.S. federalism that foils secession is that our 
state boundary lines are drawn arbitrarily and cut across regional and 
cultural divisions. Whereas a four-state federation of the Northeast, South, 
Midwest, and West would accentuate regional divisions, the fifty-state U.S. 
federation blurs them. The United States has many border and swing states 
that blur over the regional and cultural fault lines that divide Americans 
from one another. Thus, border states like Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware, 
and Missouri are joined by purple swing states like Virginia, North 
Carolina, Florida, New Hampshire, Ohio, Colorado, Nevada, and 
Wisconsin. The effect is to hide and minimize the fairly sharp division of 
the United States into Red- and Blue-state America rather than accentuate 
it. In a four-state federation, regional and cultural cleavages would be 
accentuated and enhanced. This explains why a four-state federal 
government in the United States might not last whereas a fifty-state federal 
government is very stable. 
This point can be illustrated by looking at the United States’ northern 
neighbor, Canada, a federation with only ten provinces. The British, with a 
passion for neatness, originally divided Canada into the French-speaking, 
Catholic province of Québec and the English-speaking, Protestant province 
of Ontario.48 Today, Canada has nine English-speaking, Protestant 
provinces and one French-speaking, Catholic province.49 This federal 
structure is highly unstable. Québec has twice come very close to seceding 
from Canada, and it looks as if another secession attempt will be made 
quite soon. The collective action costs to French speakers of secession are 
very low. In contrast, if the British had divided Canada into fifty provinces, 
 
47 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Pakistan, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html [http://perma.cc/GV6Y-REEZ]. 
48 See generally JOHN G. BOURINOT, CANADA UNDER BRITISH RULE 1760–1900 (G.W. Prothero 
ed., 1900). 
49 Canada, supra note 20. 
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instead of ten, with many of them being bilingual, the collective action 
costs of organizing a secession would likely be prohibitively high. The 
error in institutional design of the Canadian federation is that it has too few 
federal subunits, and the borders of the federal subunits reinforce rather 
than cut across the regional, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences in 
Canadian society. 
The same problem is evident in the United Kingdom. The United 
Kingdom has devolved power to four regional subunits: Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland, and the City of London. The Scots have just held a 
referendum on secession from the United Kingdom, and 45% of those 
voting favored secession.50 The country was held together only after the 
three main party leaders in London pledged a massive increase in the 
amount of power devolved to the Scottish parliament.51 One cannot help 
but note that the federalism boundary lines of the four nations within the 
United Kingdom accentuate rather than blur regional and ethnic 
differences. 
The same problem is evident in Spain, which devolves power only to 
Catalonia and the Basque regions, and in Belgium, which devolves power 
only to Flanders and Wallonia.52 Having a small number of regional 
subunits, with boundary lines drawn to reinforce, rather than blur, deep-
seated political cleavages, is a recipe for civil strife and threats of 
secession. Early on, the British divided their empire in India into Hindu and 
Islamic constituencies out of a desire for neatness.53 It was no accident then 
that when British India became independent, it immediately split into the 
separate nations of India and Pakistan.54 It may be that the gulf between 
Hindus and Muslims was so vast that even a fifty-state federal structure 
with randomly drawn boundary lines could not have lasted, but it would 
have certainly had a better chance of lasting than the two constituency 
structure that the British used instead. 
 
50 See Witte & Adam, supra note 25. 
51 Id. 
52 See Devolution in Spain: A Nationality, Not a Nation, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/16490065 [http://perma.cc/H6ZT-L26U]; Belgium’s New 
Government: Separatism Revised, ECONOMIST, (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
europe/21623750-flemish-nationalists-get-first-taste-government-uncertain-results-separatism [http://
perma.cc/TR6Q-AR8J]. 
53 See Paul R. Brass, The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: 
Means, Methods, and Purposes, 5 J. GENOCIDE RES. 71, 73 (2003).  
54 See Pakistan, supra note 47. 
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Consider Switzerland, which has been a huge success economically 
and in providing its citizens with a high quality of life55 even though it is 
sharply divided among German, French, and Italian speakers and between 
Protestants and Catholics.56 It turns out that the cleavages in Swiss politics 
crosscut one another so that the German speakers are divided among 
Protestants and Catholics, which is also the case for the French speakers.57 
Another big fault line in Swiss politics is urban versus rural voters.58 But, 
as with religious cleavages, both German and French speakers are divided 
between urban and rural voters. On top of all of these crosscutting 
cleavages, the Swiss, for historical reasons, have adopted a federal system 
with a large number of fairly small federal subunits. Switzerland has 
twenty-six cantons and half cantons59 even though the country has roughly 
only eight million inhabitants,60 making it similar in population to the State 
of Virginia.61 Switzerland’s small territorial size makes its division into 
twenty-six federal subunits, complete with greatly devolved powers, all the 
more striking. In other words, Switzerland is a success because its 
linguistic, religious, and urban–rural cleavages all crosscut one another 
while its large number of federal subunits raises the collective action costs 
of secession or regionalist political action. This is in contrast to Canada, 
where about 75% of the Catholics and 80% of the French speakers live in 
the province of Québec and most of the Protestants and English speakers 
live in the other nine provinces.62 In Canada, there are no crosscutting 
cleavages, and the cleavages that exist break along the same line. 
 
55 Switzerland, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/
switzerland/ [http://perma.cc/L85B-ZZ9F] (finding that Switzerland ranks highly in many quality-of-
life indices). 
56 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Switzerland, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sz.html [http://perma.cc/NRU5-4KWQ]. 
57 Kurt B. Mayer, The Jura Problem: Ethnic Conflict in Switzerland, 35 SOC. RES. 707, 714–15 
(1968). But see CAROL L. SCHMID, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN SWITZERLAND 148–49 (1981) 
(arguing that crosscutting “seems insufficient to explain Swiss coexistence,” because “[c]ross-cutting 
cleavages do not eliminate polar-opposite groups, but merely reduce their size relative to groups . . . in 
between”). 
58 The urban–rural divide in Swiss politics has been particularly pronounced on the issue of 
immigration. See, e.g., Catherine Bosley, Swiss Brace for Sour EU Relations After Immigration Vote, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-09/swiss-brace-for-
sour-eu-relations-after-immigration-vote.html [http://perma.cc/JNF9-2K72]. 
59 Switzerland, supra note 56. 
60 Id. 
61 Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.html [http://
perma.cc/Y6HC-MWM6]. 
62 Approximately 80% of French-speaking Canadians live in Québec, and approximately 79% of 
Québec residents are French speakers. Population by Reported Mother Tongues, Canada, 2006 and 
2011, STAT. CAN., http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-314-x/2011001/tbl/
tbl3-eng.cfm [http://perma.cc/7S9C-E3RT] (last modified Jan. 24, 2013). Approximately 45% of 
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So how is it then, historically, that the United States ended up with 
such a large number of federal subunits with arbitrarily drawn boundaries 
that cut across and suppress regional and cultural cleavages? To some 
extent, the U.S. phenomenon of a large number of federal subentities is a 
matter of good luck. The thirteen original American colonies were founded 
by different groups of emigrants, many of them religious sects that wanted 
their own religiously pure colonies. Massachusetts and Connecticut were 
founded and maintained by Puritan dissenters from the Church of England 
and established the Congregational Church as their official church well into 
the nineteenth century.63 Rhode Island was founded by Roger Williams, on 
the principle of extending religious liberty to all its citizens.64 Pennsylvania 
was founded by Quakers,65 Maryland by Catholics,66 and the Episcopal 
Church prevailed in the southern colonies of Virginia, the Carolinas, and 
Georgia.67 Dutch-acquired New York State, in turn, had its own religious 
history.68 Efforts by England to merge New York and the New England 
colonies into one large “Dominion of New England” in the 1680s were 
bitterly and successfully resisted by the colonists.69 Thus, the original 
thirteen U.S. colonies were small and had arbitrarily drawn borders largely 
as a matter of historical accident. 
In the 1780s, U.S. leaders faced a critical decision about what to do 
with the vast Northwest Territory, which ultimately became the states of 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota.70 Both 
 
Canadian Catholics live in Québec, and approximately 75% of Québec residents are Catholics. 
Compare NHS Profile, Quebec, 2011, STAT. CAN., http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/
prof/details/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=24&Data=Count&SearchText=Quebec&Search
Type=Begins&SearchPR=01&A1=All&B1=All&GeoLevel=PR&GeoCode=24 [http://perma.cc/WA8H
-PPJ4] (last modified Apr. 28, 2014), with NHS Profile, Canada, 2011, STAT. CAN., 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=01
&Data=Count&SearchText=Canada&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&A1=All&B1=All&
Custom=&TABID=1 [http://perma.cc/Q43B-S39G] (last modified Apr. 28, 2014). 
63 Richard Albert, Religion in the New Republic, 67 LA. L. REV. 1, 34, 36–37 (2006). 
64 Id. at 37–39; see also SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
166 (2d ed. 2004). 
65 AHLSTROM, supra note 64, at 207–08. 
66 Id. at 331. 
67 Id. at 184 (Virginia); id. at 197–98 (North and South Carolina); id. at 134 (Georgia). 
68 See id. at 252–53 (describing New York State’s rich Dutch Lutheran and German Lutheran 
heritage). 
69 RICHARD D. BROWN & JACK TAGER, MASSACHUSETTS: A CONCISE HISTORY 47–49 (rev. ed. 
2000). 
70 Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The 
Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L. J. 1820, 1843 
(2011). 
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Virginia and Connecticut had claims to this territory,71 but colonial leaders 
wisely recognized that American federalism would be unstable if one 
State—Virginia—was asymmetrically much larger and more populous than 
the rest. To assuage their fearful their neighbors and enable the passage of 
the Articles of Confederation, Virginia and others agreed to cede their 
claims to the United States. The founding generation thus wisely ceded the 
Northwest Territories to the Continental Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation,72 and, in 1787, the Continental Congress passed the 
Northwest Ordinance, which abolished slavery in the Northwest Territories 
and divided the territory into a large number of prospective future states so 
no one state would be too big or powerful.73 The Framers thus made a 
conscious choice with the Northwest Territory in favor of having a large 
number of small states. 
A similar choice was also made with respect to the Louisiana 
Purchase—the vast area of the western states—which President Thomas 
Jefferson bought from the French Emperor Napoleon for the bargain-
basement price of $15 million.74 Ultimately, fifteen states were carved out 
of the Louisiana Territory.75 Additional states were carved out of the 
territory obtained as a result of the Lewis and Clark expedition and the 
Mexican–American War.76 In 1868, at the height of Reconstruction, the 
United States already had thirty-seven states, and by 1912 eleven more had 
been added, bringing the total number to forty-eight.77 The events of the 
Civil War may have encouraged national leaders between 1868 and 1912 to 
break up federal territories along arbitrary boundary lines into a large 
number of small states. 
A similar choice was made by the French Revolutionaries after 1789, 
when they broke up the thirty-four traditional French Provinces, many of 
which had distinctive regional subcultures, such as Brittany’s and 
Corsica’s, into eighty-one departments in the contiguous European territory 
 
71 Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 33, at 3–4; see also Bartholomew H. Sparrow, Empires External 
and Internal: Territories, Government Lands, and Federalism in the United States, in THE LOUISIANA 
PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION 1803–1898, at 231, 231–32 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew 
H. Sparrow eds., 2005). 
72 John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 
72–73 (2001). 
73 An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 
1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789). 
74 THOMAS FLEMING, THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 136 (2003). 
75 Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 33, at 4. 
76 Id. 
77 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 201, 207 (1996).  
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of France.78 Since 1789, France has been a staunchly unitary nation-state 
with no federalism overlay.79 The divide and conquer approach of the 
French revolutionaries explains why French nationalism has been so 
dominant now for over 200 years. 
Some federal nation-states have maintained important and powerful 
federal subunits but have redrawn their states’ boundary lines. After World 
War II the Allied powers broke up the German megastate of Prussia—
which had a long-standing, distinct militarist culture and 60% of the 
population of the Federal Republic of Germany80—into a large number of 
smaller German states.81 The Soviet Union divided the portions of Prussia 
in the former nation of East Germany into the states of Brandenburg, 
Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while the three Western 
Allied powers divided the portions of Prussia in the former nation of West 
Germany into the new German states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower 
Saxony, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein.82 German 
state borders were thus redrawn after World War II to create a larger, 
sixteen-member state federation in which no one state could dominate and 
which would therefore be more stable. Other federations, such as India, 
have also redrawn state boundary lines for federal reasons.83 These efforts 
have proved to be very successful. 
The relevance of these examples to questions of institutional design is 
that American small-state federalism is highly successful because it gives 
the United States the advantages of decentralization, competition, and 
experimentation among fifty states while rendering the states too weak to 
credibly threaten to secede. Federalism boundary lines in the United States 
cut across—rather than reinforce—religious, linguistic, ethnic, racial, and 
cultural cleavages. This blurring of boundary lines is a large part of the 
reason why American federalism works. In other nations that have 
experimented with federalism or confederations, such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain, central planners have foolishly drawn 
 
78 FRANÇOIS FURET, REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 1770–1880, at 87–88 (Antonia Nevill trans., 1992). 
79 David Fontana, Relational Federalism: An Essay in Honor of Heather Gerken, 48 TULSA L. REV 
503, 506 (2013). 
80 CHRISTOPHER CLARK, IRON KINGDOM: THE RISE AND DOWNFALL OF PRUSSIA, 1600–1947, at 
672 (2006) (describing the Allied powers’ perception of a militaristic, absolutist “Prussianism”). 
81 Id. at xii. 
82 Carl J. Friedrich, The Peace Settlement with Germany—Political and Military, 257 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 119 (1948). 
83 See, e.g., RAJASHRI CHAKRABARTI & JOYDEEP ROY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., EFFECT OF 
REDRAWING OF POLITICAL BOUNDARIES ON VOTING PATTERNS: EVIDENCE FROM STATE 
REORGANIZATION IN INDIA 1 (2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/
sr301.pdf [http://perma.cc/8H9N-YFZZ]. 
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federalism boundary lines so that they reinforce religious, linguistic, ethnic, 
racial, and cultural cleavages. As a matter of institutional design, this is the 
height of folly. Federalism can give a country a strong national government 
with foreign and military power while retaining the benefits of substantial 
decentralization—competition and experimentation among states. But, 
federalism can only be sustained if there is a large number of federal 
subunits whose boundary lines crosscut divisive social cleavages. This is an 
important lesson of institutional design, which constitution writers ignore at 
their own peril. It should be noted in this regard that in some federations, 
such as Germany and India, the federal government has the express power 
to unilaterally initiate a change in state boundaries. In India, the federal 
government may effect such changes unilaterally.84 In Germany, the federal 
government may unilaterally propose such changes, which take effect only 
on approval by referendum held in the affected states.85 This is not allowed 
in the United States. 
Institutional structure affects whether a regime functions well and 
produces high GDP per capita, or whether it causes a democracy to fail, 
either by reverting to dictatorship or leading to impoverishment.86 The first 
such example concerns U.S. federalism and the large number of states 
within the United States.87 I turn next to dictatorship and impoverishment 
 
84 INDIA CONST. art. 3 (providing that Parliament has power to increase or diminish the area of a 
state, to alter the boundaries of a state, and to create new states from the territory of existing states). 
85 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], 
May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 29, § 2 (Ger.) (providing that the federal government may enact laws 
altering state boundaries, which must be approved by referendum held in the affected territories to take 
effect). 
86 Roger B. Myerson, Democratic Decentralization and Economic Development, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF AFRICA AND ECONOMICS 756, 756–57 (Célestin Monga & Justin Yifu Lin eds., 2015).  
87 A critic might note that when the Ottoman Empire was broken up after World War I into the 
nation states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other nation states of 
the Arabian peninsula, the World War I victors drew arbitrary “lines in the sand” between Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan, and that this has worked out quite badly. Sunni and Shiite Muslims have 
fought constant civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, while the Israeli–Palestinian dispute has been 
nothing short of catastrophic. This is exactly the outcome readers of this essay should expect because 
only seven new nation states, and not fifty, were forged out of the Ottoman Empire (if one ignores the 
small emirates on the Arabian Peninsula) between 1918 and 1922. What should have happened, in my 
opinion, is that the Ottoman Empire should have been retained as a free trade area and as a foreign 
policy entity with an imperial guarantee for civil and religious rights. The Empire should then have 
been arbitrarily chopped up into fifty smaller pieces, each of which could elect two senators to an 
imperial senate with an Ottoman president elected using an American-style electoral college. Such an 
arrangement would have worked much better than did the creation of the nation states of Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, with the Kurds left homeless. I believe there would have been a 
Federalist No. 10-style imperial protection of minority rights in such a large, heterogeneous regime and 
there would have been no Sunni–Shiite or Israeli–Palestinian civil wars. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 75, 
78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that a federalist republican form of 
government, encompassing a “variety of parties and interests” makes it difficult to coordinate 
oppression of a minority by the national government). 
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in Part II, which discusses five features of the U.S. separation of powers 
that work to prevent our presidential system from deteriorating into 
dictatorship, as has happened in many foreign regimes. Those foreign 
regimes falling victim to dictatorships have set up presidential, separation 
of powers systems. Together, these two features, structural federalism and 
separation of powers, have caused the U.S. Constitution to be a brilliant but 
misunderstood success. They help prove that correct institutional structures 
can indeed make a difference as to whether a regime succeeds or fails. 
II. THE U.S. MODEL OF CONSTRAINED PRESIDENTIALISM 
A second noteworthy feature of the U.S. Constitution is that it creates 
a very strong and powerful executive figure in the President of the United 
States. U.S. Presidents are Commanders in Chief of the U.S. armed forces 
and play a huge role in foreign policy and national defense.88 An age-old 
problem of designing a constitutional democracy is how best to balance the 
need for order with the need for liberty. The U.S. Constitution protects 
liberty with its system of checks and balances, separation of powers, and 
federalism, but it protects order and maintains foreign policy heft thanks to 
the presidency. Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in The Federalist No. 
70 that: 
 There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous 
executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The 
enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that 
the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, 
without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the 
protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations 
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of 
liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of 
anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often 
that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, 
under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of 
ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole 
classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all 
government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the 
conquest and destruction of Rome. 
 There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this 
head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A 
 
88 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”). See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWERS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
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feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government 
ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad 
government.89  
I think Hamilton was right about this. Energy in the executive is a critical 
factor in producing good government. Thanks to our energetic presidential 
system, we won the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and 
most recently wars in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
As President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed in 1940, the United 
States is the “great arsenal of democracy.”90 We are not only a democracy, 
but we are also the preeminent global superpower—the leading military 
force throughout the world.91 It is U.S. military might that makes Russia 
hesitant about reconquering Eastern Europe and that keeps China from 
invading Taiwan or Japan. No parliamentary prime minister, dependent on 
a coalition to maintain his government, is in as strong a position in military 
and foreign affairs as the President of the United States. Yale professor 
Bruce Ackerman believes that Germany’s parliamentary system of 
government is better than the U.S. separation of powers system,92 but he is 
wrong. Germany free rides on U.S. military and foreign policy. It does not 
and cannot defend itself. Without the U.S. presidential, separation of 
powers system, Germany would never have been reunited. Its eastern zone 
would be run by the Russians, and its western zone would be intimidated 
and cowed by them. My further responses to Professor Ackerman can be 
found in three law review articles.93 
It is true that Britain from 1867 until World War II had a 
parliamentary system and a strong foreign and military policy under such 
leaders as Benjamin Disraeli, William Gladstone, and Sir Winston 
Churchill. Thus, it is not impossible for a parliamentary system of 
government to be a foreign policy and military success—so long as its 
election laws give it a two-party system rather than a multi-party system 
with weak coalition governments. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Britain 
 
89 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 87, at 421–22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
90 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Security (Dec. 29, 1940), in 1940 THE PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 633, 643 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). 
91 Daniel W. Drezner, Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think), 38 INT’L 
SECURITY 52, 55–56 (2013). 
92 Ackerman, supra note 5. 
93 Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman is 
Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001) [hereinafter 
Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidental Government]; Steven G. Calabresi & Kyle Bady, Is the Separation 
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lost her Empire, mistakenly appeased Adolf Hitler in the 1930’s, and would 
have lost World War II without American intervention. Moreover, Britain 
today is at best a regional power, whereas the United States is the 
preeminent global superpower. The military and foreign policy power of 
the American presidency is thus a hugely important institutional design of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Constitution’s creation of a powerful 
presidency carries with it severe risks—risks that have become a dismal 
reality in almost every country that has tried to copy the U.S. presidential, 
separation of powers system.94 The sad fact is that almost every other 
democracy in the world that sought to copy the U.S. presidential system 
has degenerated at some point or another into a presidential dictatorship. 
This is true of every country in Latin America,95 as well as in Indonesia,96 
the Philippines,97 South Korea,98 and most recently Russia.99 Efforts to 
export the U.S. presidential system of institutional design have been 
nothing short of catastrophic. 
The reason for this catastrophe is that foreign countries that have 
copied our presidential system have often experienced presidential 
dictatorships because they have rarely copied other critical features of our 
constitutional system that check and balance presidential power. I will 
briefly discuss some of the critical checks and balances that keep U.S. 
presidents from being able to stage coups d’état.100 
First, American presidents are elected for only a four-year term with a 
two-term limit,101 and midterm elections must be held two years into a four-
 
94 See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 642–88; see also Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary 
Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3, 3–6 (Juan 
J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994). 
95 See Javier Corrales, Hugo Boss, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 32–40 (discussing the 
autocratic government of Hugo Chavez while noting the general decline in Latin American 
dictatorships). 
96 See MICHAEL R.J. VATIKIOTIS, INDONESIAN POLITICS UNDER SUHARTO: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE NEW ORDER 1–5 (3d ed. 1998). 
97 William H. Overholt, The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos, 26 ASIAN SURV. 1137, 1137–39 
(1986). 
98 See Yong Cheol Kim et al., Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave 
Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia, 79 PAC. AFF. 247, 249–50 (2006) (discussing 
the Chun government and the transition to democracy). 
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Crackdown Holds Russia Back, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 68, 70 (“Although the formal 
institutional contours of the Russian political system have not changed markedly under Putin, the actual 
democratic content has eroded considerably.”). 
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year presidency and again six years into an eight-year presidency. In those 
midterm elections, all of the House of Representatives and one-third of the 
Senate are up for reelection.102 The party not in control of the White House 
almost always wins the midterm elections, usually crippling the President’s 
ability to act on his own.103 Newly elected, popular U.S. presidents like 
Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama thus had essentially two years to 
accomplish their domestic political agenda. Presidents can implement their 
program for two years until their respective parties lose the midterm 
election. After that their power is hugely constrained, and presidents tend 
then to turn their attention to foreign policy where they can often act 
without Congress’s consent. Most countries that have copied the U.S. 
presidency have not copied our system of midterm elections. This has 
proved to be a huge mistake. Midterm elections keep our presidents on a 
straight and narrow path to compromise. 
This is especially true because thirty-nine of the fifty states elect their 
governors and state legislators during the midterm elections or during a 
year that does not coincide with presidential elections.104 Thus, the party 
out of power in the White House typically comes to control a majority of 
the nation’s governorships after the first midterm election.105 A majority of 
the nation’s governors were Democrats during the Reagan years, 
Republicans during the Clinton years, Democrats during George W. Bush’s 
presidency, and now Republicans during the Obama presidency.106 No 
president could stage a coup d’état when Congress and the state 
governments are controlled by their political foes. This is a critical 
institutional design feature of U.S. presidentialism that prevents presidents 
from becoming dictators. 
A second critical institutional design feature of U.S. constitutionalism 
that constrains presidential power is our vigorous congressional system of 
oversight. Congress is armed with subpoena power107 and has the power to 
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8KAD-Y9PV]. The exception to this general rule is the first seven years of George W. Bush’s 
presidency; Democrats did not gain a majority of governorships until 2007. Id. 
107 Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Indeed, the Necessary 
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confirm or reject the President’s executive and judicial branch nominees.108 
U.S. congressional committees are very powerful and concerned with the 
parts of the executive branch they supervise.109 There are no term limits for 
congressional service on oversight committees, so senators and 
congressmen can serve on those committees for decades—long outlasting a 
president who serves for only four-to-eight years. Career civil servants 
given a choice between pleasing an oversight committee member or the 
president will often choose to please the former because the civil service 
laws effectively give civil servants life tenure.110 Thus, it is of greater 
benefit to please those with significantly longer tenure—e.g., 
congressmen—than those with a fixed term—e.g., the President. 
The Senate’s role in confirming presidential nominees is another 
feature of presidentialism that greatly constrains presidential power. This 
feature, however, is not copied in all foreign countries. Just as civil servants 
seek to please those with greater tenure, they also want to be promoted and 
know they may need Senate confirmation to get a promotion. Thus, 
pleasing forces on Capitol Hill is often equally—or more—important as 
pleasing the President. 
Third, U.S. presidents have no power to declare states of emergency 
or to propose national referenda. This makes the U.S. president weaker 
than, for example, the president of France who can do both of those 
things.111 It also avoids one of the many flaws in the German constitution of 
the Weimar Republic, during which presidents declared countless states of 
emergency,112 thus paving the road for Adolf Hitler to come to power. 
Fourth, U.S. presidents are subject to judicial review by a life-tenured 
federal judiciary headed by the Supreme Court whose members today serve 
an average of twenty-six years in office.113 The Supreme Court is almost 
always dominated by the appointees of prior presidents that often belonged 
to the opposite political party from the incumbent president. The Supreme 
Court enjoys relatively high favorability ratings114 and often acts vigorously 
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to clip a president’s wings. Foreign supreme court and constitutional court 
justices do not have life tenure and often serve short terms so they pose less 
of a check on presidential power.115 In some foreign countries, such as 
Argentina, presidents have begun their terms by firing or impeaching and 
removing all the supreme court justices appointed by their predecessors.116 
This is unthinkable in the United States, and similarly, a U.S. president 
cannot remove state governors, a power granted to the president of Russia 
less than a year into Vladimir Putin’s presidency.117 U.S. presidents are 
powerful, but they are subject to many meaningful checks and balances. 
In conclusion, there are many critical checks and balances on the 
power of U.S. presidents, which make it impossible for them to turn 
themselves into the leaders of a coup d’état or dictatorship. The 
institutional design of the U.S. presidency makes our presidents very strong 
in foreign and military affairs, but fairly weak with respect to domestic 
power. Often, U.S. presidents only get two years out of a potential eight to 
accomplish a major domestic initiative, and even then, they must usually 
compromise to get their initiative through two houses of Congress and past 
a hostile Supreme Court. Those countries that have tried to copy the U.S. 
presidential, separation of powers system have failed to copy the 
institutional design features of the U.S. Constitution, which act formidably 
to check and balance presidential power. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay’s goal has been to prove that racial, linguistic, cultural, and 
religious cleavages, as well as traditions of authoritarian rule, can 
sometimes be overcome by clever systems of institutional design. I have 
tried to identify one feature of American federalism and five features of 
American presidentialism that reveal cleverness in institutional design. 
These underappreciated features of the U.S. Constitution help explain why 
our democracy has prospered and expanded for 225 years, and why it is 
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I am under no illusion that other federal, separation of powers systems 
could suddenly become peaceful and prosperous solely by emulating the 
features of American institutional design discussed in this short Essay. 
Some countries, such as Nigeria, face a daunting lack of crosscutting 
cleavages that even the best institutional design might be unable to 
overcome. I do hope, however, that this Essay has illuminated at least two 
features of the U.S. Constitution’s institutional design that have contributed 
to the success of the American constitutional system. 
 
 
